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#4933. Inheritance tax, shareholder protection, and the market value of family firms: A cross-country analysis
| July 2026 | publication date |
| Proposal available till | 02-06-2025 |
| 4 total number of authors per manuscript | 0 $ |
| The title of the journal is available only for the authors who have already paid for |
| Journal’s subject area: |
| Strategy and Management; Business and International Management; |
| place 1 | place 2 | place 3 | place 4 |
| Free | Free | Free | Free |
| 2350 $ | 1200 $ | 1050 $ | 900 $ |
Contract №4933.1   | Contract №4933.2 | Contract №4933.3 | Contract №4933.4 |
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Abstract:
We examine the relationship among inheritance taxes, shareholder protection, and the family firms market value. Drawing on the family firm, corporate governance, and institutional complementarities literature, we argue that inheritance taxes act as external corporate governance mechanisms for decoupling business families socioemotional goals. In strong protection countries, the incentives for family self-governance created by high inheritance taxes are offset by the loss of business family autonomy inherent in strong shareholder protection. Results suggest that inheritance and shareholder protection laws are substitutive external corporate governance mechanisms to align business family and nonfamily shareholders interests. We investigate how inheritance taxes and shareholder protection laws interact to generate several outcomes that can benefit or harm family firms market value. We find evidence consistent with these ideas when examining a sample of publicly traded firms across 31 countries. Our results corroborate that policymakers concerns regarding the protection of minority shareholders must not consider only investor protection laws, but also how investor protection interact with other institutions such as inheritance law.
Keywords:
corporate governance; family firms; firm market value; inheritance tax; institutions; shareholder protection
Contacts :
2 place - free (for sale)
3 place - free (for sale)
4 place - free (for sale)
Abstract:
We examine the relationship among inheritance taxes, shareholder protection, and the family firms market value. Drawing on the family firm, corporate governance, and institutional complementarities literature, we argue that inheritance taxes act as external corporate governance mechanisms for decoupling business families socioemotional goals. In strong protection countries, the incentives for family self-governance created by high inheritance taxes are offset by the loss of business family autonomy inherent in strong shareholder protection. Results suggest that inheritance and shareholder protection laws are substitutive external corporate governance mechanisms to align business family and nonfamily shareholders interests. We investigate how inheritance taxes and shareholder protection laws interact to generate several outcomes that can benefit or harm family firms market value. We find evidence consistent with these ideas when examining a sample of publicly traded firms across 31 countries. Our results corroborate that policymakers concerns regarding the protection of minority shareholders must not consider only investor protection laws, but also how investor protection interact with other institutions such as inheritance law.
Keywords:
corporate governance; family firms; firm market value; inheritance tax; institutions; shareholder protection
Contacts :
