#2386. Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab

November 2026publication date
Proposal available till 29-06-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript3510 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Economics and Econometrics;
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Abstract:
The article analyzes the sequential subordination of preferences in the tasks of centralized matching. The methodology is based on field and laboratory experiments. Based on a comparison of the widely used Boston Mechanism (BM) with the famous Delayed Acceptance Mechanism (DA), it has been shown that sequential BM implementation can achieve superior equilibrium results compared to student-optimal stable compliance. The results show that consistent presentation of preferences can enable students to overcome coordination problems in school choice.
Keywords:
Matching theory; School choice; Sequential-move games

Contacts :
5