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#12431. Riding on the power of the masses? How different modes of mass mobilization shape local elite bargaining in China
| July 2026 | publication date |
| Proposal available till | 11-05-2025 |
| 4 total number of authors per manuscript | 0 $ |
| The title of the journal is available only for the authors who have already paid for |
| Journal’s subject area: |
| Political Science and International Relations; Sociology and Political Science; Public Administration; |
| place 1 | place 2 | place 3 | place 4 |
| Free | Free | Free | Free |
| 2350 $ | 1200 $ | 1050 $ | 900 $ |
Contract №12431.1   | Contract №12431.2 | Contract №12431.3 | Contract №12431.4 |
1 place - free (for sale)
2 place - free (for sale)
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4 place - free (for sale)
Abstract:
When local bureaucrats in China disagree with their superiors, official channels for achieving a policy revision are limited and generally ineffective. However, if the stakes involved are high, they may turn to the power of the masses and draw on public pressure to enhance their negotiating position. In such informal inter-bureaucratic bargaining, local officials might intentionally facilitate popular protest and lead to a situation we call ‘mobilized instability.’
More commonly, they discreetly leak insider information and instruct their police forces to be exceptionally tolerant. In this article, we show how local officials can strategically exploit public pressure, in the mode of ‘consent instability,’ to extract policy concessions. We introduce the concept of ‘mobilized instability’ through an examination of jurisdictional restructuring conflict. This analysis suggests that reckless intermediaries might over-mobilize and radicalize the masses, thereby undermining intentions and leading to serious consequences for the public officials. The article concludes that the power of the masses may serve as a credible bargaining chip during informal elite bargaining, but it can also be risky for those who handle it poorly.
Keywords:
backfire; consent instability; informal elite bargaining; Local bureaucrats; mobilized instability; the masses
Contacts :
2 place - free (for sale)
3 place - free (for sale)
4 place - free (for sale)
Abstract:
When local bureaucrats in China disagree with their superiors, official channels for achieving a policy revision are limited and generally ineffective. However, if the stakes involved are high, they may turn to the power of the masses and draw on public pressure to enhance their negotiating position. In such informal inter-bureaucratic bargaining, local officials might intentionally facilitate popular protest and lead to a situation we call ‘mobilized instability.’
More commonly, they discreetly leak insider information and instruct their police forces to be exceptionally tolerant. In this article, we show how local officials can strategically exploit public pressure, in the mode of ‘consent instability,’ to extract policy concessions. We introduce the concept of ‘mobilized instability’ through an examination of jurisdictional restructuring conflict. This analysis suggests that reckless intermediaries might over-mobilize and radicalize the masses, thereby undermining intentions and leading to serious consequences for the public officials. The article concludes that the power of the masses may serve as a credible bargaining chip during informal elite bargaining, but it can also be risky for those who handle it poorly.
Keywords:
backfire; consent instability; informal elite bargaining; Local bureaucrats; mobilized instability; the masses
Contacts :
