#6174. A rational delegating computation protocol based on reputation and smart contract

September 2026publication date
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Journal’s subject area:
Computer Networks and Communications;
Software;
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Abstract:
The delegating computation has become an irreversible trend, together comes the pressing need for fairness and efficiency issues. To solve this problem, we leverage game theory to propose a smart contract-based solution. First, according to the behavioral preferences of the participants, we design an incentive contract to describe the motivation of the participants. Next, to satisfy the fairness of the rational delegating computation, we propose a rational delegating computation protocol based on reputation and smart contract. More specifically, rational participants are to gain the maximum utility and reach the Nash equilibrium in the protocol. Besides, we design a reputation mechanism with a reputation certificate, which measures the reputation from multiple dimensions. The reputation is used to assure the client’s trust in the computing party to improve the efficiency of the protocol. Then, we conduct a comprehensive experiment to evaluate the proposed protocol.
Keywords:
Incentive contract; Nash equilibrium; Rational delegating computation; Reputation mechanism; Smart contract

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