#5790. Predicting focal point solution in divergent interest tacit coordination games

July 2026publication date
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Journal’s subject area:
Theoretical Computer Science;
Artificial Intelligence;
Software;
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Abstract:
In divergent interest tacit coordination games there is a tradeoff between selecting a solution with a high individual payoff and one which is perceptually more salient to both players, i.e., a focal point. To construct a cognitive model of decision making in such games we need to consider both the social value orientation of the players and the game features. Therefore, the goal of this study was to construct a cognitive model for predicting the probability of selecting a focal point solution in these types of games. Using bootstrap aggregated ensemble of decision trees that was trained on the “bargaining table’ game behavioural data were able to predict when players will select a focal point solution.
Keywords:
Cognitive modelling; decision-making; divergent interest; social value orientation (SVO); tacit coordination

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