#5427. Strictly and ?-robust counterparts of electricity market models: Perfect competition and Nash–Cournot equilibria

July 2026publication date
Proposal available till 15-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript0 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Statistics and Probability;
Control and Optimization;
Strategy and Management;
Management Science and Operations Research;
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Abstract:
This paper mainly studies two topics: linear complementarity problems for modeling electricity market equilibria and optimization under uncertainty. We consider both perfectly competitive and Nash–Cournot models of electricity markets and study their robustifications using strict robustness and the ?-approach. For three out of the four combinations of economic competition and robustification, we derive algorithmically tractable convex optimization counterparts that have a clear-cut economic interpretation. In the case of perfect competition, this result corresponds to the two classic welfare theorems, which also apply in both considered robust cases that again yield convex robustified problems. Using the mentioned counterparts, we can also prove the existence and, in some cases, uniqueness of robust equilibria.
Keywords:
Electricity market equilibrium models; Linear complementarity problems; Nash–Cournot competition; Perfect competition; Robust optimization

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