#5370. Allocating a fixed cost across decision-making units with undesirable outputs: A bargaining game approach

August 2026publication date
Proposal available till 13-05-2025
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Journal’s subject area:
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty;
Modeling and Simulation;
Strategy and Management;
Management Science and Operations Research;
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Abstract:
Allocating a fixed cost among a set of peer decision-making units (DMUs) is one of the most important applications of data envelopment analysis. However, almost all existing studies have addressed the fixed cost allocation (FCA) problem within a traditional framework while ignoring the existence of undesirable outputs. Undesirable outputs are neither scarce in various production activities in real world applications nor trivial in efficiency evaluation and subsequent decision making. Motivated by this observation, this article attempts to explicitly extend the traditional FCA problem to situations in which DMUs are necessarily involved with undesirable outputs. To this end, we first investigate the efficiency evaluation of DMUs considering undesirable outputs based on the joint weak disposability assumption. Then, flexible FCA schemes are considered to revisit the efficiency evaluation process.
Keywords:
bargaining game; comprehensive satisfaction degree; data envelopment analysis (DEA); fixed cost allocation (FCA); undesirable outputs

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