#5063. The effect of information transparency on capital budgeting with privately informed agents: a short research note

July 2026publication date
Proposal available till 30-05-2025
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Journal’s subject area:
Accounting;
Management Information Systems;
Management of Technology and Innovation;
Strategy and Management;
Management Science and Operations Research;
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Abstract:
This paper reports on an experiment designed to examine the effects of information transparency in a multi-agent capital budgeting setting. Two subordinates with private information regarding their own project costs submit budget requests to a superior who observes both requests before deciding which projects to fund. In the high transparency (low transparency) treatment, subordinates observe (do not observe) each other’s costs. Further, subordinates submit significantly higher budget requests on average in the high transparency treatment. In response, superiors are more likely to reject budgets in the high transparency treatment, reducing efficiency. These results suggest that while information sharing may improve decision making in many settings, it may also come at a cost when privately informed subordinates have access to information on other subordinates’ projects.
Keywords:
Capital budgeting; Information asymmetry; Internal control; Multi-agent

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