#5017. Credit guarantee types for financing retailers through online peer-to-peer lending: Equilibrium and coordinating strategy

July 2026publication date
Proposal available till 24-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript0 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Modeling and Simulation;
Management Science and Operations Research;
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering;
Computer Science (all);
Information Systems and Management;
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Abstract:
This study investigates the role of a credit guarantee company and a peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platform in the financing business of a capital-constrained retailer who faces uncertain demand over a single period. The credit guarantee company is divided into two types: conservative and adventurous. In a decentralized financing system, the guarantee types will influence all local optimal decision variables in Stackelberg equilibrium, and the optimal order quantity setting under the adventurous credit guarantee type is more flexible than that under the conservative one. Under the adventurous credit guarantee, the P2P lending platform financing system can achieve supply chain financing (SCF) coordination, but under the conservative credit guarantee, SCF coordination cannot be achieved. When a credit guarantee company is adventurous and the coordination condition on order quantity is satisfied, the information service fee rate linearly decreases in the guarantee service fee rate.
Keywords:
Coordination; Credit guarantee; Finance; Peer-to-peer lending; Stackelberg game

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