#5015. Check Only Once? Health Information Exchange between Competing Private Hospitals

July 2026publication date
Proposal available till 23-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript0 $

The title of the journal is available only for the authors who have already paid for
Journal’s subject area:
Management Science and Operations Research;
Strategy and Management;
Information Systems and Management;
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More details about the manuscript: Science Citation Index Expanded or/and Social Sciences Citation Index
Abstract:
Health check is essential in medical diagnostic procedures, so double-check becomes common if patients have physical examination/blood tests in one hospital but transfer to another hospital in the next period. To save patients’ costs, blockchain-based health information exchange for differentiated service is advocated but competing hospitals usually have incentive conflicts, especially those private hospitals who are most concerned with profitability. We formulate their tradeoffs towards health information exchange and find that interestingly, the two hospitals achieve incentive alignment when their profit loss in health check fee is significant and the service competition is intensified. We identify two driving forces, namely, the quality improvement effect and the price compensation effect, to interpret the rationality of the hospitals’ preferences of health information exchange.
Keywords:
Blockchain applications; Healthcare service competition; Information exchange; Two-period model

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