#5014. Mechanism design of multi-strategy health insurance plans under asymmetric information

July 2026publication date
Proposal available till 23-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript0 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Management Science and Operations Research;
Strategy and Management;
Information Systems and Management;
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More details about the manuscript: Science Citation Index Expanded or/and Social Sciences Citation Index
Abstract:
In health insurance services, the health system is often unable to obtain peoples private genetic information. This knowledge can reflect individuals’ future health, which leads to their information advantage. To reduce this inefficiency, we design a mechanism for the health system to build a set of multi-strategy combination insurance plans for heterogeneous probabilistic individuals, where the prices and the price difference of plans guide their choice and prevention strategy. First, after analysing the utility of the individuals and the health system when the individuals use true/false information, we propose a reasonable goal of this mechanism: When the people use true information to make decisions, the individuals and the health system can obtain maximum utility. Second, we provide the conditions for the individuals and the health system to participate in health insurance, and the conditions for achieving the rationality goal of the mechanism. Finally, we obtain the optimal result for the individuals and the health system.
Keywords:
Health insurance plan; Individual concealment; Information asymmetry; Mechanism design; Multi-strategy combination plan

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