#4580. Corporate governance “bundles” and firm acquisitiveness

August 2026publication date
Proposal available till 19-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript0 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Business, Management and Accounting (all);
Strategy and Management;
Management of Technology and Innovation;
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Abstract:
We explore how the interrelations of governance mechanisms (“bundles”) influence a firms propensity for corporate acquisitions. Focusing on four key internal and external mechanisms, namely, board of directors monitoring, CEO pay incentives, takeover market discipline, and institutional investor monitoring, we use a sample of 1171 completed M&A deals by 799 U.S. firms during the period 1998–20XX to test the Substitution versus Complementarity Hypotheses. The findings provide, in the main, support for both the Substitution and the Complementarity Hypotheses, with several incentives alignment, internal and external monitoring mechanisms acting as substitutes and complements of each other toward firm acquisitiveness. They offer new evidence that combinations or “bundles” of firm-level governance mechanisms can allow for differing degrees of firm acquisitiveness. Different governance “bundles” will have different implications for major strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. Firms seeking to control or increase acquisition propensity can thus consider “equifinal” governance configurations, whereby alternative combinations of governance mechanisms can lead to comparable, desired outcomes.
Keywords:
acquisitions; complementarity; configurational perspective; Corporate governance; governance bundles; substitution

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