Articles for sale

#4482. Monitoring or payroll maximization? What happens when workers enter the boardroom?

August 2026	publication date
Proposal available till	15-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript	0 $

The title of the journal is available only for the authors who have already paid for

Journal’s subject area:

Accounting; Business, Management and Accounting (all);

Places in the authors’ list:

place 1	place 2	place 3	place 4
Free	Free	Free	Free
2350 $	1200 $	1050 $	900 $
Contract №4482.1	Contract №4482.2	Contract №4482.3	Contract №4482.4

1 place - free (for sale)
2 place - free (for sale)
3 place - free (for sale)
4 place - free (for sale)

Abstract:
We examine whether worker representation on corporate boards results in improved monitoring or payroll maximization. Several economic theories predict that worker representatives would use control and voting rights in the boardroom to transform firm assets into private benefits and increased wages, but labor contract models suggest that workers’ inside information should permit improved monitoring. Using hand-collected data, our results suggest that the worker representatives’ payroll maximization incentives dominate their monitoring duties. Specifically, worker representatives reduce real earnings management when it results in wage cuts or job losses but not when it increases payroll or job security. Similarly, worker representatives are generally associated with improved monitoring of tax planning activities. This evidence helps policymakers and researchers better understand the role of workers in corporate governance systems and contributes to the ongoing public debate about introducing worker representation.
Keywords:
Agency conflict; Corporate governance; Earnings management; Monitoring; Payroll maximization; Tax avoidance; Worker representation

Contacts :