#3831. Defeasibility, Law, and Argumentation: A Critical View from an Interpretative Standpoint

September 2026publication date
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Journal’s subject area:
Philosophy;
Linguistics and Language;
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Abstract:
The phenomenon of defeasibility has long been a central theme in legal literature. This artcle aims to shed new light on that phenomenon by clarifying some fundamental conceptual issues. Such a definition is poorly constructed, inaccurate and generates many problems. Indeed, the definition hides the close relationship between legal defeasibility and legal interpretation. The article argues that no new definition is needed. Contrary to what some authors maintain, no unique or privileged source of legal defeasibility exists, nor are there privileged arguments to justify it. Specifically, legal defeasibility refers to interpretative outcomes deriving from interpretative arguments that, on the one hand, are very different from one another, and, on the other, are often employed to justify different interpretative outcomes. In conclusion, this paper argues that as far as legal argumentation is concerned, the notion of legal defeasibility lacks explanatory power, and it should be abandoned.
Keywords:
Exceptions; Legal defeasibility; Legal interpretation; Literal meaning; Non-monotonic logic; Pragmatic argumentation

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