#3762. Essentializing inferences
October 2026 | publication date |
Proposal available till | 08-06-2025 |
4 total number of authors per manuscript | 0 $ |
The title of the journal is available only for the authors who have already paid for |
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Journal’s subject area: |
Language and Linguistics;
Linguistics and Language; |
Places in the authors’ list:
1 place - free (for sale)
2 place - free (for sale)
3 place - free (for sale)
4 place - free (for sale)
Abstract:
Predicate nominals (e.g., “is a female”) seem to label or categorize their subjects, while their adjectival correlates (e.g., “is female”) merely attribute a property. Predicate nominals also elicit essentializing inferential judgments about inductive potential and stable explanatory membership. Data from psychology and semantics support that this distinction is robust and productive. I argue that while the difference between predicate nominals and predicate adjectives is elided by standard semantic theories, it ought not be. I then develop and defend a psychologically motivated semantic account on which predicate nominals attribute kind membership and trigger a presupposition that underpins our essentialist judgments.
Keywords:
adjectives; essentialism; kinds; nouns; predicates; presupposition
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