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#3761. The limits of moral dumbfounding

October 2026	publication date
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Journal’s subject area:

Psychology Language and Linguistics; Linguistics and Language;

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Abstract:
In moral psychology, “psychological rationalism” is the view that moral judgments are caused by a process of reasoning. Jonathan Haidt argues against this view by showing that people succumb to “moral dumbfounding”—they cannot adequately provide reasoning for their moral judgment. I argue that this evidence undermines psychological rationalism only if the view is committed to two claims about reasoning: (a) reasoning must meet an adequacy condition, and (b) reasoning must be sufficiently conscious. I argue that plausible variants of psychological rationalism are not committed to these requirements. Thus, the efficacy of the dumbfounding objection is more limited than it might initially seem.
Keywords:
moral dumbfounding; moral judgment; moral psychology; moral reasoning; psychological rationalism

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