#3760. Are sensory experiences contingently representational? A critical notice of David Papineaus The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience

October 2026publication date
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Abstract:
There is a new argument against representationalism, centering on the idea that sensory experiences are essentially representational on this view. He defends his own “qualitative view” according to which sensory experiences are only contingently representational. I discuss his main argument against essentialist representationalism and then provide two challenges for his positive account. First, Papineaus theory faces a dilemma when it comes to explaining the contents of our perceptual beliefs in situations where the conscious character of sensory experience comes apart from what it represents. Second, we may need to abandon the idea that sensory experiences are assessable for veridicality.
Keywords:
contingent representation; perception; qualitative view; representationalism; sensory experience

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