#2757. Matching with floor constraints

November 2026publication date
Proposal available till 30-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript3510 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all);
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Abstract:
The article develops a theory of market matching under minimal constraints. We introduce the notion of stability, which we call minimum stability, for markets where (hard) minimum restrictions must be met. A match is minimally stable if there is no coalition of physicians and hospitals that can offer an alternative match that is feasible and better for its participants.
Keywords:
efficiency; floor constraints; Matching; stability; strategy-proofness

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