#2754. Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions

November 2026publication date
Proposal available till 30-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript3000 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all);
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Abstract:
The article analyzes an auction of a divisible good with a single price, in which two groups participate, each of which has a finite number of identical bidders competing in demand schedules. The results show that the strategic complementarity of traders demand slopes is reinforced by price-based inference effects and show the role of payoff and information asymmetries in explaining deadweight losses.
Keywords:
Demand/supply schedule competition; electricity auctions; liquidity auctions; market integration; private information; treasury auctions

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