#2753. Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification

December 2026publication date
Proposal available till 30-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript3510 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all);
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Abstract:
The welfare-maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two-stage scheme. First, agents report their budgets, receive cash transfers, and decide whether to enter a lottery over the good. Second, recipients of the good can sell it on a resale market but must pay a sales tax. Low-budget agents receive a higher cash transfer, pay a lower price to enter the lottery, and face a higher sales tax. They are also randomly inspected.
Keywords:
budget constraints; costly verification; efficiency; Mechanism design

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