#2630. Political budget cycles revisited: Testing the signalling process

December 2026publication date
Proposal available till 30-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript3510 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Political Science and International Relations;
Economics and Econometrics;
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Abstract:
The article conducted a survey among representative citizens of Germany 20XX 20XX years. The results show that only a small proportion of voters feel well informed about the financial budget signal and use the information it contains to decide whether to vote for the incumbent politician.
Keywords:
Fiscal policy; Germany; Local government; Political budget cycles; Representative population survey; Signalling mechanism

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