#2584. Authority, Monitoring, and Incentives in Hierarchies

November 2026publication date
Proposal available till 30-05-2025
5 total number of authors per manuscript3020 $

The title of the journal is available only for the authors who have already paid for
Journal’s subject area:
Finance;
Accounting;
Economics and Econometrics;
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Abstract:
The article explores three elements of management control: incentive remuneration, performance monitoring, and delegation of authority to managers to enter into contracts with lower-level employees. As a result, important direct and indirect interactions between these endogenous controls are highlighted, topics that are often highlighted in the economics and accounting literature using the analogy of the three-legged stool. The results demonstrate the circumstances in which the controls complement or replace each other and demonstrate a consistent pattern of practices observed together.
Keywords:
hierarchy; incentive; monitoring; multi-agent contracting; performance evaluation

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