#2533. Does licensing improve welfare with rent dissipation?

October 2026publication date
Proposal available till 30-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript3510 $

The title of the journal is available only for the authors who have already paid for
Journal’s subject area:
Economics and Econometrics;
Places in the authors’ list:
place 1place 2place 3place 4
FreeFreeFreeFree
1050 $940 $820 $700 $
Contract №2533.1 Contract №2533.2 Contract №2533.3 Contract №2533.4
1 place - free (for sale)
2 place - free (for sale)
3 place - free (for sale)
4 place - free (for sale)

Abstract:
The article analyzes Cournot oligopolists participating in a patent competition for cost-cutting innovations, where the winner of the competition can license a patent to his competitors. The results show that while licensing always increases the incentive to innovate, it can reduce the welfare of small innovations, but generally does not improve the welfare of large ones. Our result is consistent with recent policy reforms that require patent protection to focus on core innovation.
Keywords:
Licensing; Overlapping research expenditure; Patent competition; Patent protection; Rent dissipation; Welfare

Contacts :
0