#2442. Dynastic control without ownership: Evidence from post-war Japan

September 2026publication date
Proposal available till 30-05-2025
5 total number of authors per manuscript3530 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Accounting;
Finance;
Economics and Econometrics;
Strategy and Management;
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Abstract:
The article examines the problem of dynastic control based on data from post-war Japan. The results show that dynasty-controlled firms are headed by the CEOs of the founding families, while the family owns a minor share of the capital. However, firms differ in key performance indicators from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and develop from the former as equity-funded growth erodes family ownership over time.
Keywords:
Family control; Ownership; Succession

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