#2415. Selectorate’s information and dictator’s accountability

October 2026publication date
Proposal available till 30-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript3510 $

The title of the journal is available only for the authors who have already paid for
Journal’s subject area:
Political Science and International Relations;
Economics and Econometrics;
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Abstract:
The article examines the evolution of accountability in autocracy and the subsequent progressive economic and political mismanagement in terms of information change. The results show that under dictatorships, the best information can mean the worst choice for the dictator. The basic idea is that the reputation mechanism that underlies accountability only works if there is enough buzz around the possible type of dictator. As the information of the constituency about the actual type of dictator increases over time, the dictators incentives to behave correctly disappear.
Keywords:
Accountability; autocracy; dictator; information

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