#2408. Rules versus norms: How formal and informal institutions shape judicial sentencing cycles

November 2026publication date
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4 total number of authors per manuscript4010 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Economics and Econometrics;
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Abstract:
The article analyzes the features of the cycles of sentencing. Research shows that elected judges impose longer sentences when they are ready for re-election. Based on recently collected sentencing data for seven additional states, significant and previously unrecognized heterogeneity in the strength of sentencing cycles is found. This heterogeneity seems to be due to interstate differences in the informal rules for challenging serving judges in judicial elections.
Keywords:
Electoral sentencing cycles; Judge elections

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