#2306. Program design and heterogeneous treatment effects of payments for environmental services

September 2026publication date
Proposal available till 30-05-2025
5 total number of authors per manuscript5020 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Economics and Econometrics;
Environmental Science (all);
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Abstract:
This study highlights the incentive design of payments for environmental service (PES) and ecosystem providers behavioral responses using a standard principal-agent model. I establish a hypothesis that as long as the PES conditionality is implemented and enforced effectively, ecosystem service (ES) providers more likely to participate in the scheme perform better in terms of environmental resource conservation. An empirical analysis in this study uncovers heterogeneous treatment effects in favor of the ES providers whose propensity scores for scheme participation are relatively high.
Keywords:
Additionality; Conditionality; Heterogeneous treatment effects; Incentive design; Payments for environmental services; Screening game

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