#2296. An experiment on partial cross-ownership in oligopolistic markets

September 2026publication date
Proposal available till 30-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript3510 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Economics and Econometrics;
Strategy and Management;
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Abstract:
We examine coordinated and unilateral effects of horizontal partial cross-ownership (PCO) in a laboratory experiment. We consider homogeneous Bertrand markets where firms have symmetric, non-controlling shares of each other, and conduct the experiment with both stranger and partner matching. The partner data (repeated game) confirm the prediction that firms are more (tacitly) collusive with PCO than without.
Keywords:
Antitrust; Bounded rationality; Collusion; Competition; Experimental economics; Minority shareholdings; Passive partial ownership; Quantal response equilibrium

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