#2276. Redistribution Through Markets

September 2026publication date
Proposal available till 30-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript5020 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Economics and Econometrics;
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Abstract:
Policymakers frequently use price regulations as a response to inequality in the markets they control. In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of such policies from the perspective of mechanism design. We study a buyer-seller market in which agents have private information about both their valuations for an indivisible object and their marginal utilities for money. The planner seeks a mechanism that maximizes agents total utilities, subject to incentive and market-clearing constraints.
Keywords:
inequality; Mechanism design; redistribution; welfare theorems

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