#2188. Overlapping board connections with banker directors and corporate loan terms: Evidence from syndicated loans

May 2026publication date
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Journal’s subject area:
Finance;
Economics and Econometrics;
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Abstract:
I look at the relationship between corporate loan terms and board members connections to bankers through employment on other boards, a connection relatively unaffected by confounding factors. Using syndicated loan data, I find that firms connected to bankers via other boards are more likely to borrow, and they receive cheaper pricing. However, loan maturity does not differ between connected and unconnected firms. During the 20XX–20XX financial crisis loan availability declined for all firms, but connected firms continued to borrow and to receive lower spreads.
Keywords:
Asymmetric information; Bank lending; Board of directors; Lending outcomes; Social networks; Syndicated loans

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