#12268. One-sided bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

July 2026publication date
Proposal available till 26-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript0 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Sociology and Political Science;
Finance;
Economics and Econometrics;
Places in the authors’ list:
place 1place 2place 3place 4
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Contract №12268.1 Contract №12268.2 Contract №12268.3 Contract №12268.4
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2 place - free (for sale)
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4 place - free (for sale)

Abstract:
I consider a bargaining game in which only one player can make proposals and the space of proposals is finite. Thus, the game is like a situation where: (1) a CEO suggests a possible hire, who must be okayed by a board of directors, or (2) the US president nominates a potential judge, who must be okayed by the Senate. My main result is an algorithm that finds the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. The number of steps in the algorithm is on the order of the number of possibilities (e.g., applicants to a job) that the bargainers may consider. A corollary of the main result, similar to some results of previous bargaining models, is that the wait costs of only one player, the non-proposer, is relevant to the outcome. The wait costs of the proposer are irrelevant, provided that they are positive. Applied to the nomination process specified by the US Constitution, the corollary suggests that only the Senates wait costs are relevant to the outcome—the presidents wait costs are irrelevant. As I argue, this result may explain a little-noticed regularity of American politics: the Senate seems to have much influence in the selection of lower-court judges but relatively little influence in the selection of Supreme Court justices.
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