#12067. State Congressional Delegations and the Distribution of Federal Funds

August 2026publication date
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Journal’s subject area:
Sociology and Political Science;
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Abstract:
Most scholarship on U.S. distributive politics either focuses on the abilities of individual representatives and senators to bring home the bacon or highlights the role the president plays in influencing funding decisions. Little attention is paid to collective efforts in Congress involved in securing grants-in-aid to states. We assess how characteristics of House and Senate state delegations affect the collective efforts of a state’s federal officeholders to secure statewide funds. In both the House and Senate, we find that partisan cohesion in a state delegation predicts more federal funds to states. In particular, states receive more funds when larger shares of their delegations are members of a chamber’s majority party. Moreover, we find that the importance of majority party status is increasing over time. These results have important implications for the U.S. federal system and distributive politics.
Keywords:
congress; congressional delegations; distributive politics; federal funds; majority parties

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