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#12064. Unpacking administrative rank: Intercity competition and the remaking of local state space in China
| August 2026 | publication date |
| Proposal available till | 16-05-2025 |
| 4 total number of authors per manuscript | 0 $ |
| The title of the journal is available only for the authors who have already paid for |
| Journal’s subject area: |
| Geography, Planning and Development; |
| place 1 | place 2 | place 3 | place 4 |
| Free | Free | Free | Free |
| 2350 $ | 1200 $ | 1050 $ | 900 $ |
Contract №12064.1   | Contract №12064.2 | Contract №12064.3 | Contract №12064.4 |
1 place - free (for sale)
2 place - free (for sale)
3 place - free (for sale)
4 place - free (for sale)
Abstract:
The literature on interurban competition emphasizes that market rules as an external coercive power dominate local state space conducive to economic growth. The research tries to find out whether there is another external coercive power to promote and mitigate interurban competition. Thus, the paper specifies that Chinas political efforts to downplay the market role and remake interurban competition rules could have far-reaching implications for urban political economy. The study considers two Chinese border cities adjacent to Myanmar. While reranking is supposed to balance out the inefficiencies of market principles in interurban competition, multiple rounds of reranking in these cities indicate that this political orchestration can turn interurban competition into a cutthroat game for economic growth and thus create problems for macroeconomic management. Nevertheless, it can become a political tool to revamp the game by strategically selecting some cities as nodes of development at the sacrifice of the urban fortunes of other cities. In this process, market rules operate in parallel with, and sometimes succumb to, the principle of political order from above. This finding expands the geographies of the state: the co-constitution of the local and the national becomes necessary and pragmatic since interurban competition is not a territorially-conditioned endeavor, but remains open to extra-local stakeholders—upper-level governments in this case—who can remake local state space.
Keywords:
Administrative rank; China; Interurban competition; State intervention
Contacts :
2 place - free (for sale)
3 place - free (for sale)
4 place - free (for sale)
Abstract:
The literature on interurban competition emphasizes that market rules as an external coercive power dominate local state space conducive to economic growth. The research tries to find out whether there is another external coercive power to promote and mitigate interurban competition. Thus, the paper specifies that Chinas political efforts to downplay the market role and remake interurban competition rules could have far-reaching implications for urban political economy. The study considers two Chinese border cities adjacent to Myanmar. While reranking is supposed to balance out the inefficiencies of market principles in interurban competition, multiple rounds of reranking in these cities indicate that this political orchestration can turn interurban competition into a cutthroat game for economic growth and thus create problems for macroeconomic management. Nevertheless, it can become a political tool to revamp the game by strategically selecting some cities as nodes of development at the sacrifice of the urban fortunes of other cities. In this process, market rules operate in parallel with, and sometimes succumb to, the principle of political order from above. This finding expands the geographies of the state: the co-constitution of the local and the national becomes necessary and pragmatic since interurban competition is not a territorially-conditioned endeavor, but remains open to extra-local stakeholders—upper-level governments in this case—who can remake local state space.
Keywords:
Administrative rank; China; Interurban competition; State intervention
Contacts :
