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#11760. The Federal Enforcement Threat: The Effect of Overfiling Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
| July 2026 | publication date |
| Proposal available till | 20-05-2025 |
| 4 total number of authors per manuscript | 0 $ |
| The title of the journal is available only for the authors who have already paid for |
| Journal’s subject area: |
| Law; Education; |
| place 1 | place 2 | place 3 | place 4 |
| Free | Free | Free | Free |
| 2350 $ | 1200 $ | 1050 $ | 900 $ |
Contract №11760.1   | Contract №11760.2 | Contract №11760.3 | Contract №11760.4 |
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Abstract:
States and the federal government typically share responsibility for environmental enforcement, with many states acquiring primary authority to enforce federal law. Under most federal environmental statutes, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) retains the right to “overfile,” or file its own enforcement action against a violator in addition to a state enforcement action. This article empirically tests the effect of EPAs ability to overfile on the states enforcement strategy in the context of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). This article predicts that states within the Eighth Circuit with preferences for lower environmental enforcement would impose more lenient penalties after the Harmon decision, and it tests this prediction using several proxies for state environmental enforcement preferences. In other estimations, I also find that states in the Eighth Circuit with Republican governors collected less, on average, in final penalty amount per enforcement action after the Harmon decision. Other proxies for lower enforcement preferences, however, were not associated with consistent statistically significant effects. Because the governor arguably has the strongest influence on state enforcement policy, the results provide some support for the models preference-based predictions. These findings shed light on how federal enforcement efforts might matter in the context of cooperative federalism.
Keywords:
Environmental enforcement; federal law; cooperative federalism; preference-based predictions
Contacts :
2 place - free (for sale)
3 place - free (for sale)
4 place - free (for sale)
Abstract:
States and the federal government typically share responsibility for environmental enforcement, with many states acquiring primary authority to enforce federal law. Under most federal environmental statutes, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) retains the right to “overfile,” or file its own enforcement action against a violator in addition to a state enforcement action. This article empirically tests the effect of EPAs ability to overfile on the states enforcement strategy in the context of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). This article predicts that states within the Eighth Circuit with preferences for lower environmental enforcement would impose more lenient penalties after the Harmon decision, and it tests this prediction using several proxies for state environmental enforcement preferences. In other estimations, I also find that states in the Eighth Circuit with Republican governors collected less, on average, in final penalty amount per enforcement action after the Harmon decision. Other proxies for lower enforcement preferences, however, were not associated with consistent statistically significant effects. Because the governor arguably has the strongest influence on state enforcement policy, the results provide some support for the models preference-based predictions. These findings shed light on how federal enforcement efforts might matter in the context of cooperative federalism.
Keywords:
Environmental enforcement; federal law; cooperative federalism; preference-based predictions
Contacts :
