#10176. Conspiracy against the public - An experiment on collusion

September 2026publication date
Proposal available till 29-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript0 $

The title of the journal is available only for the authors who have already paid for
Journal’s subject area:
Social Sciences (all);
Economics and Econometrics;
Applied Psychology;
Places in the authors’ list:
place 1place 2place 3place 4
FreeFreeFreeFree
2350 $1200 $1050 $900 $
Contract №10176.1 Contract №10176.2 Contract №10176.3 Contract №10176.4
1 place - free (for sale)
2 place - free (for sale)
3 place - free (for sale)
4 place - free (for sale)

Abstract:
We study to what extent collusive behavior is affected by the awareness of negative externalities. Theories of outcome-based social preferences suggest that negative externalities make collusion harder to sustain than predicted by standard economic theory, while sociological theories of social ties and intergroup comparisons suggest that bilateral cooperation can be strengthened if there exist outsiders that gain from cooperative break down. We investigate this in a laboratory experiment. Subjects play the infinitely repeated prisoners dilemma with and without a negative externality. The externality is implemented by letting subjects make a positive contribution to a public good if they choose to deviate from cooperation between the two, i.e. cooperation is collusive since the gains are at the expense of the public.
Keywords:
Collusion; Cooperation; Experiment; Infinitely repeated prisoners dilemma game; Negative externality

Contacts :
0