#5843. Open-Loop Equilibrium Strategies for Dynamic Influence Maximization Game over Social Networks

August 2026publication date
Proposal available till 16-06-2025
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Journal’s subject area:
Computer Science (all);
Mechanical Engineering;
Control and Systems Engineering;
Electrical and Electronic Engineering;
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Abstract:
We consider the problem of budget allocation for competitive influence maximization over social networks. In this problem, multiple competing parties (players) want to distribute their limited advertising resources over a set of social individuals to maximize their long-run cumulative payoffs. It is assumed that the individuals are connected via a social network and update their opinions based on the classical DeGroot model. The players must decide on the budget distribution among the individuals at a finite number of campaign times to maximize their overall payoff as a function of individuals opinions.
Keywords:
convex optimization; dynamic games; network resource allocation; open-loop Nash equilibrium; Opinion dynamics; social networks

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