#3758. Reply to Laura Gows critical notice of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
October 2026 | publication date |
Proposal available till | 08-06-2025 |
4 total number of authors per manuscript | 0 $ |
The title of the journal is available only for the authors who have already paid for |
|
|
Journal’s subject area: |
Philosophy;
Language and Linguistics;
Linguistics and Language; |
Places in the authors’ list:
1 place - free (for sale)
2 place - free (for sale)
3 place - free (for sale)
4 place - free (for sale)
More details about the manuscript: Arts & Humanities Citation Index or/and Social Sciences Citation Index
Abstract:
In the Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, Laura Gow challenges on three points. (1) Does my central argument against representationalism about perception commit me to an overly abstract view of properties? (2) What does my view imply about the representational contents of beliefs prompted by sensory experiences? (3) Do I do sufficient justice to the way sensory experience seems representational? The research considers them in turn.
Keywords:
consciousness; intentionality; perception; representation; sensory experience
Contacts :