#3107. Towards a behavioral theory of MNC response to political risk and uncertainty: The role of CEO wealth at risk

November 2026publication date
Proposal available till 29-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript3510 $

The title of the journal is available only for the authors who have already paid for
Journal’s subject area:
Finance;
Business and International Management;
Marketing;
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Abstract:
This article examines how the equity position of a CEO facing loss in the form of restricted shares influences the response of multinational corporations (MNCs) to political risk and political uncertainty. The results show that while increasing the CEOs equity-at-risk capital in the form of restricted shares reinforces the (positive) relationship between political risk and the choice of multinational corporations to invest in new projects rather than outright acquisition, the CEOs equity-at-risk wealth , does not affect the relationship between political uncertainty and the choice of multinational companies to invest in new projects.
Keywords:
Acquisitions; Behavioral Agency; CEO Compensation; Greenfields; Political Risk; Political Uncertainty

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