#3036. Bargaining power and budget ratcheting: Evidence from South Korean local governments

November 2026publication date
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Journal’s subject area:
Finance;
Accounting;
Information Systems and Management;
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Abstract:
The results show that the budget reduction in case of underspending is greater than the budget increase in case of overspending, which contrasts with the documented asymmetric budget ratchet model. In addition, the results show that budget increases in case of overspending are stronger when government officials have more bargaining power, as evidenced by local governments located in the metropolitan area that have greater financial independence and are associated with the ruling party.
Keywords:
Bargaining power; Budget; Justifying budget; Local government; Ratchet principle

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