#2163. Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and forced CEO turnover

September 2026publication date
Proposal available till 21-05-2025
4 total number of authors per manuscript6510 $

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Journal’s subject area:
Economics and Econometrics;
Business and International Management;
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Abstract:
Using manually collected data of Chinese listed non-financial corporations, we find that multiple large shareholders (MLS) inhibit performance sensitivity to forced CEO turnover and are unrelated to forced CEO turnover-integrity sensitivity. The results illustrate that the reduced performance sensitivity to forced turnover stems from the controlling coalition of MLS in emerging economies. The equity balance, large shareholders size, and the absence of controlling shareholders can escalate the inhibiting effect of MLS. State-owned ownership mitigates the inhibiting role of MLS through political governance.
Keywords:
Control contests; Forced CEO turnover; Multiple large shareholders

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